

## CHAPTER XXXII.

### **Partition of the territories of Tippu Sultan among the allies and the reconstitution of the Mysore State.**

The death of Tippu Sultan relieved Lord Mornington of any embarrassment that might have been caused to him if the former had survived. General Harris was equally relieved of all immediate care by the surrender of Tippu's family and of his principal officers and he was able thereby to establish peace in the country and to consolidate his position. The practical suggestions made by Purnaiya also went far to help the commander-in-chief for the proper disposal of the wreck of Tippu Sultan's army without the possibility of their roaming in the country as free-booters.

In a letter addressed to the Court of Directors in London on the 11th May Lord Mornington while expressing his satisfaction at the success that had attended his efforts to subjugate Tippu Sultan, at the same time stated that though the dreadful fate of the fallen ruler could not be contemplated without emotions of pain and regret, yet it should serve as a salutary lesson to Indian princes and should prove the danger of violating public engagements and inviting foreign invasion for the prosecution of schemes of ambition and hatred against the British Power. It was at first the intention of Lord Mornington to himself proceed to Seringapatam for the final settlement of affairs there and as a preliminary he sent his private secretary Henry Wellesley another brother of his and Lt-Col. Kirkpatrick, his military secretary with such orders as appeared immediately requisite for the guidance of General Harris. Mornington was in some fear at this time of a possibility of a French invasion of India from the Red Sea and consequently directed General Harris to detach the Bombay army and send it to the West Coast to take possession of Canara as soon as possible. General Harris was also directed to send another body of troops to take possession of the Coimbatore country and Baramahal.

On the 15th May Lord Mornington again wrote to General Harris to convey to Kamruddin of the Governor-General's great satisfaction for his unconditional submission to the generosity of the

British Power and to assure him that his claim for the jahagir of Gurumkonda would receive sympathetic consideration. He also enclosed for delivery to him a letter under his own hand and seal believing that it would tend to inspire additional confidence. The commander-in-chief was also required to inform all the sirdars and persons in high office in the Government of Tippu that the degree of favour and protection to be extended to them by the Company and the allies would be regulated according to the fidelity with which they rendered an account of all the property of the Sircar under their charge, referring in particular to the stable horse, to the draught and carriage cattle and to all arms, ordnance and stores belonging to the late Government. The Asophs and Amils were also required to hold public property of every description in their charge as well as the revenue collected at the disposal of the allies and were also apprised that a regular account of all the property and revenue would be taken with the greatest accuracy as soon as circumstances permitted. General Harris was also impressed with the immediate necessity of securing to persons of every description the safe and undisturbed possession of their private properties.

Later it was found inexpedient and unnecessary for Lord Mornington to proceed to Seringapatam for the purpose of personally settling the future of the country and he therefore appointed a Commission to assume charge of this task under his direction, consisting of General Harris, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Colonel Kirkpatrick and Lt-Col. Close with Captains Malcolm and Thomas Munro as joint secretaries and laid down the following principles for their guidance :—

1. That mode of settlement was to be preferred which should unite the most speedy restoration of peace and order with the greatest practicable security for the continuance of both.
2. For this purpose not only the interests of the Company but also those of the Nizam, of the Mahrattas and of the leading chieftains in Mysore were to be conciliated,

3. The military power of Mysore was to be broken and to be absolutely identified with that of the Company.
4. Seringapatam was to be a British garrison town under whatever nominal authority it might be placed.
5. The Company was to retain the whole of the Sultan's territory in Malabar and also in Coimbatore and Dharapuram with the heads of the passes on the table-land of Mysore.

The commissioners assembled at Seringapatam for the first time on the 8th June 1799 and were bound by oaths to keep their proceedings secret. Agreeably to Lord Mornington's instructions, their first task was to make provision for the chiefs of Tippu's army. Gurumkonda a jahagir yielding 70,000 canteroi pagodas which had formerly belonged to his father was settled on Kamruddin and his relations and he left Seringapatam on the 19th June to Gurumkonda. The chief officers were allowed the same pay as they had received from Tippu and suitable provisions were made for the families of those who had fallen during the war. As both humanity and policy required the conciliation of Tippu's sirdars, suitable pensions, hereditary or for life as circumstances indicated, were allotted to them and when this announcement was made to them at a meeting held for the purpose on the 12th June 1799, they received the same, it is said, with the liveliest sensations of gratitude. Through the persuasion of Purnaiya the Silledars without giving any trouble returned to their lands. The stable horses were allotted to complete the deficiencies in the different corps of the Company's cavalry, while others not fit for that service were transferred for the use of the Nizam. The Frenchmen in the service of Mysore were sent as prisoners of war to Madras. Thus the Sultan's army was almost entirely broken up.

Regarding the division of the Mysore territories, Mornington was guided mostly by considerations of expediency and in part by those of justice. In a despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 3rd August 1799, he summarised these considerations and said that the Company and the Nizam by their conquest had derived an

undoubted right to dispose of the conquered territories either by dividing the whole between themselves or by allowing others also to participate on grounds of humanity or policy in such division. The Mahrattas, in his opinion, having taken no share in the war had forfeited every pretension to participate in the advantages which had accrued. The numerous progeny of Tippu Sultan, he further said, could plead no title which had not been superseded by the conquest of the kingdom. Nor was it possible in estimating their claims to forget the usurpation of Haidar Ali and the sufferings of the unfortunate Hindu royal family displaced from the throne of Mysore. To the free and uncontrolled exercise of the right of conquest vested in the Company and the Nizam no obstacle existed in the internal state of the Kingdom of Mysore, the whole body of the inhabitants of the country having manifested the most favourable disposition to submit to the Company's Government. The policy of Tippu Sultan had been to concentrate not only the whole authority of the State but the whole administration of the Government in his own person, with the result that the numerous Mahomedan Sirdars and others employed by him possessed neither individual weight nor collective force. Many of them had been killed either at Malavalli, Siddeswar or Seringapatam during the course of the war. Most of the survivors together with their families were actually concentrated in the fortress of Seringapatam entirely dependent on the clemency of the Company's Government. Lord Mornington finally concluded that the approved policy, interests and honour of the British nation required that the settlement of the extensive territories now at their disposal should be based on principles acceptable to the inhabitants of the conquered territories, and that such settlement should be just and conciliatory towards the contiguous Native States and indulgent to every party in any degree affected by the consequences of the success of the British arms.

It was considered that an equal division of territory between the Nizam and the Company would afford strong grounds of jealousy to the Mahrattas and would augment the Nizam's power beyond all bounds of discretion. Further, such a division would place in the hands of the Nizam many of the strong fortresses on the northern frontier of Mysore and would expose the Company's

frontier in that quarter to every predatory incursion, besides laying the foundation of perpetual differences not only between the Mahrattas and the Nizam but also between the Company and both those powers. At the same time, it was obviously unjust and inexpedient to allow the Mahrattas who had borne no part in the expenses or the hazards of the war an equal share along with the Company and the Nizam, not to speak of the danger accruing from a considerable expansion of the Mahratta empire. It was however deemed advisable to enlist the goodwill of the Mahrattas by offering to them such portions of the territory as might give them an interest in the new settlement without offence or injury to the Nizam and without danger to the Company's possessions. It was equally advisable to limit the territory retained in the hands of the Company and of the Nizam within such bounds of moderation as would bear a due proportion to their respective expenses in the contest and to the necessary means of securing the safety of their respective dominions. In these circumstances all considerations pointed, in Lord Mornington's eyes, to the expediency of the establishment of a central and separate Government in Mysore under the protection of the Company and the admission of the Mahrattas to a certain participation in the division of the conquered territories. Such a solution, it was considered, would reconcile the interests of all parties and would secure to the Company a less invidious and more efficient share of revenue, resource, commercial advantage and military strength than was obtainable under any other method.

Under the distribution carried out according to this pronouncement of Lord Mornington, to the Company's share fell Canara, Coimbatore and Dharapuram with all the territories lying below the Ghauts between the Company's territories in the Carnatic and those in Malabar. These acquisitions were useful to the Company not only on account of their intrinsic value in point of revenue but also because they secured an uninterrupted tract of territory from the coast of Coromandal to that of Malabar, together with the entire sea coast of the Kingdom of Mysore and the base of all the eastern, western and southern Ghauts. To these were also added the forts and posts forming the heads of all the passes above

the Ghauts on the table-land inasmuch as it was regarded that the possession of the base of the Ghauts alone formed no effectual barrier to incursions from the table-land but that the possession of all the entrances of the passes situated above the Ghauts would afford such security against every possible approach of danger from the table-land. This acquisition also afforded the Company's Government ample means to curb the refractory spirit of the palegars and other turbulent and disaffected people in the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar. The whole island of Seringapatam became a British possession securing thereby communication between the Company's territories between the two coasts and also consolidated all lines of defence in every direction.

To the Nizam was allotted the districts of Gutti and Gurumkonda bordering on the division of the Mysore territory obtained by him in 1792, together with a tract of country bordering along the line of Chitaldrug, Sira, Nandidoorg and Kolar, excluding however those fortresses to the southward forming the frontier of the new Government of Mysore. To the Peshwa were reserved Harpanhalli, Soonda and Anegundi with parts of the districts of Chitaldrug and Bednore above the Ghauts. It was made a condition, however, that before allowing possession of the allotted territory the Peshwa was to accept a subsidiary force to be stationed at Poona by the Company's Government and to agree to the arbitration of the Governor-General for the settlement of the differences then existing between him and the Nizam. Further, the Peshwa was to give his consent to dismiss the French contingents under him as also to bind himself not to employ any Europeans in his service without the consent of the Company's Government.\*

The rest of the Mysore territory as it existed at the fall of Seringapatam was reconstituted into the now existing State of Mysore, slight alterations being made in its limits in later years.

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\*As the Peshwa did not agree to these conditions, the territories reserved for him were divided between the British and the Nizam. Incidentally it may also be stated here that subsequently in 1800 the Nizam ceded to the British the territories acquired from Mysore both in 1792 as well as in 1799 in return for a force of British troops to be stationed at Hyderabad.

A treaty on the above lines was concluded between the Company and the Nizam in which the Peshwa was also included conditionally and this treaty was signed on the 22nd June 1799 by the commissioners on behalf of the Governor-General and by Meer Alum on behalf of the Nizam. Lord Mornington ratified this treaty on the 26th of the same month at Madras and the Nizam did the same at Hyderabad on the 13th July of the same year. By this partition treaty the Company's revenue was augmented by about 7 lakhs of Star pagodas annually, a star pagoda being Rs.  $3\frac{1}{2}$  in value and that of the Nizam by about five lakhs of Star pagodas, while the revenue of the territory allotted for the new State of Mysore was calculated to yield 25 lakhs of Star pagodas. The revenue of the territory reserved for the Mahrattas was reckoned at about three lakhs of Star pagodas.