

CHAPTER VIII.

KRISHNARAJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(contd.).

The renewed struggle for Trichinopoly : Further attempts at a compromise between Mysore and Muhammad Ali, 1753-1754—July-September 1753—September-October 1753—October - December 1753—January - March 1754—March-April 1754—May-June 1754—June-July 1754—July-September 1754—The impasse, October 1754-January 1755—Its adverse effects on Nanjarajaiya—His persistent claims to Trichinopoly—His later movements, January-April 1755—His departure to Seringapatam, April 8, 1755.

MEANWHILE the English Government at Madras had been engaged in pursuing steadily a policy of accommodation of affairs between Mysore and Muhammad Ali, in view of the callousness of Dupleix to all proposals of peace; his ultimate design on Trichinopoly and on the English trade and settlements on the Coromandel coast; the continual increase in the strength of the French and the expected reinforcements from France; the distress and financial straits of the Nawāb, despite his success over Nanjarājaiya and Murāri Rao; the stress and burden of his campaigns on the English; and the general unrest and turmoil prevailing in South India.¹ Such an accommodation, as was expected,² would not only “immediately terminate the war [between the English and the French in the ‘Carnatic’]” but also be “a great step towards it,” while the Court of Directors in London were urging the adoption of “every pacific and prudent measure” to reconcile the Nawāb

1. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), pp. 144-145, 147, and (1754), pp. 95-96: Board's *Proceedings* dated September? 1753, and April 30, 1754.

2. *Ibid* (1754), p. 146: Board's *Proceedings* dated June 20, 1754.

and the King of Mysore, as the quarrel between them was thoroughly prejudicial to the former's affairs.³

In accordance with this policy, Saunders, in July 1753, wrote to Murāri Rao,⁴ advising him to endeavour to reconcile Muhammad Alī and Nanjarājaiya; to the Nawāb,⁵ to be friends with the Daḷavāi; and to Nanjarājaiya,⁶ to do what was expedient to extricate himself out of the difficulties he had plunged himself and his country in. He wrote⁷ also to Saiyid Lāshkar Khān to prevail upon Nanjarājaiya and Murāri to desist from hostilities, if not, contrive means to punish them. In August, Muhammad Alī communicated his willingness "to mortgage the districts belonging to Trichinopoly [*i.e.*, Madura and Tinnevely] excepting the fort" in satisfaction of the Daḷavāi's demand, desiring his allies to negotiate the affair on that footing with the Mysore Vakil, Barakki Venkaṭa Rao, at Madras.⁸ On the other hand, Nanjarājaiya, though at first seemingly little inclined to peace for fear of offending the French, about September proposed to Saunders, through Venkaṭa Rao, "either being paid the money he had advanced or put in possession of Trichinopoly, and if the latter, he would draw off the Moratta [Murāri] from the French, who with himself were to join the Nabob, settle him in the Arcot province, enter into a strict alliance with him and further would pay him a considerable sum of money and that he would also enter into a friendly alliance with the King of Tanjour [Tanjore]." ⁹

3. *Mad. Desp.* (1744-1755), p. 222: *Despatch* dated December 19, 1753.

4. *Count. Corres.* (1753), p. 92: *Letter* No. 151, dated July 16, 1753.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 100: *Letter* No. 162, dated July 30, 1753.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 101: *Letter* No. 165, dated July 31, 1753.

7. *Ibid.*: *Letter* No. 164, dated July 31, 1753.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-109: *Letter* No. 180, dated August 15, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders; also *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), pp. 137-138: *Consultation* dated August 27, 1753.

9. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1753), pp. 141, 144-145: *Consultations* dated August 25, and September? 1753; see also Appendix II—(2).

On September 12, Saunders and his Council, having resolved "to make a further trial to promote a reconciliation between the Nabob and the Dalloway" (Lawrence and Palk having failed in May-June), appointed Thomas Cooke on a Commission, with full powers to treat at the camp of Trichinopoly through Pratāp Singh of Tanjore.¹⁰ They recommended to him the conclusion of an accommodation with Nanjarājaiya on the basis of "a mortgage of the districts belonging to Trichinopoly as a security for the payment of a certain sum to be settled and agreed on in full satisfaction of all his demands on the Nabob;"¹¹ but if the Daḷavāi was to be satisfied "with anything less than Trichinopoly," he (Thomas Cooke) was desired to consent to its cession on certain specific terms advantageous to all the parties concerned.¹² In October, Muhammad Alī empowered Saunders to negotiate with Venkaṭa Rao, sending him alternative proposals;¹³ urging upon him to use his "utmost endeavours" to let the fort of Trichinopoly remain in his (Muhammad Alī's) possession and "settle peace on the assignment of the

10. *Vide* Appendix II—(2). *Thomas Cooke*: Thomas Cooke, Junior, was, on the fall of Madras in 1746, appointed a member of Council of the newly created head settlement of Fort St. David (*P. from England*, II. July 24, 1747). He was styled "junior" evidently to distinguish him from Thomas Cooke, Senior, who was also a member of the Civil Service on the Madras establishment at about the same time. Thomas Cooke, Junior, became, on Madras being declared the seat of the Presidency on April 6, 1752, a member of the Madras Council. He was 11th of Council on December 31, 1754, but under suspension (see H. D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, II. 382, 401, 437). Thomas Cooke, Senior, entered service in 1702; at the Seagate, 1712; Receiver at the Sea Gate and Land Customer, 1715; Deputy Governor of Bencoolen, in 1720, superseding Richard Farmer, who had been made a close prisoner for maltreating his subordinates and the local inhabitants; returned to Fort St. George in 1721; dismissed for disobedience of the Company's orders, and later arrested for alleged misappropriation of the Company's cash (see Love, *Ibid.*, II. 123, 145, 170, 181, 183, 184). Whether the two Cookes were brothers or not is not known.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 130-131: *Letter* No. 242, dated October 20, 1753—Nawāb to Saunders; see also Appendix II—(3), for a summary.

country;”¹⁴ and laying down the conditions on which the fort was in the last resort to be ceded to Mysore.¹⁵

Great hopes were entertained of these developments.

As a *Despatch* from Madras records,¹⁶

October-December
1753.

“The King of Mysore demands Trichinopoly; the Nabob will agree to anything but that. The Nabob certainly has no right to cede Trichinopoly and it should not be done except of absolute necessity. The King would give very advantageous terms including the repayment of the Nabob’s debt to the Company. Will do everything possible to find a middle course although the cession of Trichinopoly would probably not affect the Company’s investment at Salem as that would make the King as firm a friend of the English as an Eastern prince can be.” At Trichinopoly, Thomas Cooke at first conducted negotiations through the mediation of Pratāp Singh of Tanjore;¹⁷ and Nanjarājaiya proposed a settlement of affairs with the Nawāb for rupees 130 lakhs on the security of the Trichinopoly country.¹⁸ Pratāp Singh, however, attempted to square up for 60 lakhs on the mortgage of Madura and Tinnevely.¹⁹ However advantageous such a settlement seemed to the English, and possibly to Nanjarājaiya too, it was in reality, as the former anticipated it,²⁰ a design only to amuse, as the Rāja of Tanjore was averse to the surrender of Trichinopoly into the hands of Mysore. In particular, Pratāp Singh himself, while mediating as above, had sent in provisions and forces to Muhammad Ali’s relief at Trichinopoly during

14. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Mad. Desp.*, p. 212: *Despatch* dated October 29, 1753.

17. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 213: *Consultation* dated November 17, 1753.

18. *Count. Corres.*, p. 146: *Letter* Nos. 284 and 285, dated November 23, 1753—Saunders to Rāma Naik, and Saunders to Nawāb; p. 167: *Letter* No. 333, dated December 29, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 194: *Consultation* dated November ? 1753.

19. *Ibid.*; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 196: Council’s *Proceedings* dated November 15, 1753.

20. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 194, 196: l.c.

Nanjarājaiya's blockade of the place (September 21).²¹ In wrath, Nanjarājaiya sent back the Tanjore Vakil and the negotiations fell through.²² In November, Pratāp Singh wrote²³ to Cooke to treat direct with the Dalāvāi. Cooke's efforts, at the end of November, were of little avail, Nanjarājaiya merely continuing "to send answers" and refusing "to give up the fort."²⁴ Nor were Saunders's negotiations with Venkaṭa Rao at Madras attended with success, the latter having communicated the Dalāvāi's resolve to listen to no other proposal of the Nawāb but the last one (relating to the delivery of the Trichinopoly Fort to Mysore), objecting to its limitations (*i.e.*, rupees 15 lakhs demanded from Mysore and one year's time fixed for the actual delivery of the fort), and pointing to the need for treating direct with the king of Mysore on the subject.²⁵ So that at the end of the year an accommodation with Mysore seemed to be a remote possibility.

Nevertheless, since January 1754, the subject continued to engage the attention of the English at Fort St. George in an increasing measure. For, as the Court of Directors observed,²⁶ "the Nabob would have been much better off if he had surrendered Trichinopoly to Mysore when it was demanded of him. Hope then accommodation is still possible." Again, as they wrote,²⁷ "the quarrel between

21. *Ibid.*, p. 213: l.c.; *Count. Corres.*, p. 167: *Letter* No. 333, l.c.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Vide* f.n. 17 *supra*.

24. *Count. Corres.*, p. 153: *Letter* No. 305, dated December 14, 1753—Tanjore to Saunders; *Press List* (1750-1754), p. 666: *Letter* No. 4538, dated December 4, 1753—Cooke to Saunders.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 149: *Letter* No. 236, dated December 10, 1753—Saunders to Nawāb; also *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 196: l.c.; pp. 217-218: Council's *Proceedings* dated December 9, 1753. A *Consultation*, dated November 26, 1753 (*Ibid.*, p. 207), speaks of how Venkaṭa Rao was desired by Saunders to proceed to Seringapatam to treat with the king, leaving his family in Madras "as a mark of his good intentions," and how Venkaṭa Rao "absolutely rejected it," "offering at the same time to take the most solemn oath to return whether he succeeded or not."

6. *Mad. Desp.*, pp. 226-227: *Despatch* dated January 23, 1754.

Ibid., p. 224: l.c.

the Nabob of Arcot and the King of Mysore is the more unfortunate as it has caused a great increase in the English advances to the Nabob. Urge the necessity of securing as speedy a reimbursement as possible." Saunders moved²⁸ with Muhammad Alī in the matter of sending a proper person to negotiate with the king of Mysore himself, as the Daḷavāi, he believed, was "entirely in the power of certain people [the French];" he also advised²⁹ Nanjarājaiya not to be deceived by the French but make out his account with the Nawāb; and wrote³⁰ to Major Lawrence regarding the measures to be concerted "for satisfying the King of Mysore" (January-February). Muhammad Alī, however, less earnest about the cession of Trichinopoly to Mysore but more inclined to detach Murāri from Nanjarājaiya and make peace with Dupleix (as a means of obliging the Mysoreans and Murāri to desist from hostilities),³¹ replied about the uselessness of sending any deputy to Seringapatam.³² On the other hand, Nanjarājaiya, determined "to fight and die" if neither the fort was delivered nor the entire expenses paid to him,³³ sent in his proposals to Lawrence who replied to have the matter referred to the Governor of *Fort St. George*.³⁴ The Daḷavāi, further, wrote³⁵ to Thomas Cooke, recapitulating all his transactions with the Nawāb since he first went to his assistance, and

28. *Count. Corres.* (1754), p. 11: *Letter* No. 17, dated January 16, 1754—Saunders to Nawāb.

29. *Press List*, p. 717: *Letter* No. 4827, dated February 2, 1754—Saunders to Daḷavāi.

30. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1754), p. 32: *Consultation* dated January 31, 1754.

31. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 15 and 21: *Letter* Nos. 26 and 34, dated January 13 and 17, 1754—Nawāb to Saunders; see also and compare *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17, 38: *Letter* Nos. 27 and 56, dated January 9, and February 10, 1754.

32. *Press List*, p. 726: *Letter* No. 4873, dated February 11, 1754—Nawāb to Saunders.

33. *Count. Corres.*, p. 22: *Letter* No. 35, dated January 16, 1754—Rāma Naik to Saunders.

34. *Press List*, p. 722: *Letter* No. 4849, dated February 4, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 726: *Letter* No. 4873, dated February 11, 1754—Nawāb to Saunders.

justifying his demands on him (February). On March 13, Lawrence communicated³⁶ to Saunders about his having effected a reconciliation between Pratāp Singh of Tanjore and Nanjarājaiya, who renewed³⁷ their negotiations through Bābū Rao. This was followed by a letter³⁸ from Nanjarājaiya and his elder brother Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya (at Seringapatam), empowering Venkaṭa Rao at Madras to treat with Saunders on the subject of their demand for Trichinopoly, while Venkaṭa Rao himself submitted to the President a representation³⁹ containing the proposals for an accommodation with the Nawāb. These related in the main to the conditions under which the expenses were to be made good, or the fort of Trichinopoly delivered, by the Nawāb to Mysore, and the terms on which the latter was to enter on an alliance with the English.⁴⁰

However disagreeable an accommodation with Mysore "on the terms insisted on by the March-April 1754. Dalloway" seemed to them, the English at Madras, in considering Venkaṭa Rao's proposal, found it "preferable to the evident risk of losing the fort and exposing the army to imminent danger [at the hands of the French];"⁴¹ and came to the resolution "to close with the Dalloway on the terms offered by his Vackeel [agreeing to cede the fort to Mysore] with a few alterations which, he gives us reason to believe, his master will rather grant than break off the treaty."⁴² Accordingly, on March 25, they wrote⁴³ to Lawrence, detailing the articles of the proposed treaty

36. *Ibid.*, p. 752: *Letter* No. 5023, dated March 13, 1754—Lawrence to Saunders.

37. *Count. Corres.*, p. 58: *Letter* No. 98, dated March 17, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders.

38. *Press List*, p. 760: *Letter* No. 5066, dated March 25, 1754—Daḷavāi to Venkaṭa Rao.

39. *Vide* Appendix II—(4).

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 76-77: Council's *Proceedings* dated March 25, 1754.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Vide* Appendix II—(5).

with Mysore, pointing to the circumstances leading to the drafting of the proposals, explaining the possible objections that might be raised by the Daḷavāi in regard to certain articles (Nos. 3, 4 and 7), and empowering him to conclude the treaty on his own judgment. Muhammad Alī, in the meantime, “averse to the delivering up of Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans” under the proposed treaty, showed,⁴⁴ on the authority of letters alleged to have been received from the court of the Mughal, his inclination “to preserve the fort,” proposing⁴⁵ to the Council his own alternative which was, however, “defective in regard to no provision being made [in it] for the payment of [his] debt” to the English East India Company. On April 18, the Council were therefore of opinion⁴⁶ “that the Major [Lawrence] should be advised of what the Nabob has wrote and desired to discourse with him on the subject but by no means to be diverted from the plan of accommodation with the Dalloway, which, even if what the Nabob writes should be real, is more advantageous to the Company . . . , as the whole debt to the Company will be paid at once; but if the accommodation with the Dalloway should not take place and we should not be powerfully supported from Europe, the Board are of opinion, it will be advisable in that case to try the Nabob’s plan.” Again, on the 30th, reviewing the situation, they urged⁴⁷ upon Messrs. Lawrence and Palk to confer personally with the Nawāb and the king of Tanjore and press forward the negotiations for peace “whilst we can get any tolerable terms which, if any accidents should happen, we can have no reason to expect.”

44. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 94 and 96: Council’s *Proceedings* dated April 18 and 30, 1754.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 94, 96: l.c. The alternative or plan is not specified in the *Proceedings*. But from the context, it seems to have related to the Nawāb’s insistence on the mortgage of the Trichinopoly country to Mysore.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 94: l.c.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 96: l.c.

Early in May, Lawrence, as desired, wrote⁴⁸ to the Council, passing his remarks on the *Articles of Peace* proposed by them and those offered by Venkaṭa Rao.

May-June 1754.

On the 13th, certain alterations were permitted to be made in the proposals submitted by Venkaṭa Rao to the President (acting as mediator between Mysore and Muhammad Alī), with a Memorandum of explanations (particularly in respect of *Articles* 3, 7 and 11); and a copy of the draft thus drawn up was sent to the Major, he being requested to speedily communicate the same to the Daḷavāi to avoid further delay and suspense.⁴⁹ At the same time, the Council granted to Venkaṭa Rao a cash advance of 500 *paḷoḍas*, permitting him to depart (to Śrīrangam), "on his promise to use his endeavours to bring about the treaty."⁵⁰ On the 19th, the Council further advised⁵¹ Lawrence that the proposed treaty when concluded was to be as between the Nawāb and the king of Mysore as the Principals, with the English as mediators; that the fort of Trichinopoly was to be delivered by the Nawāb to Mysore under English guarantee "on condition [that] the usual tribute be constantly paid to the circar;" and that when the treaty was actually concluded, the Daḷavāi was to be assisted by an English detachment of 100 men in his settlement of Madura and Tinnevely. Lawrence's illness, however, prevented him from treating with the Daḷavāi,⁵² and there were difficulties in the way of appointing some one to relieve the Major in the command at Trichinopoly (May-June).⁵³ Palk's efforts at an accommodation with Mysore were equally attended with difficulties, and he wrote⁵⁴ to the

48. *Press List*, p. 794: *Letter* No. 5262, received? May 13, 1754.

49. *Vide* Appendix II—(6).

50. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 106: *Consultation* dated May 13, 1754.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 109: *Consultation* dated May 19, 1754.

52. *Press List*, p. 796: *Letter* No. 5262, received? May 13, 1754.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*, p. 811: *Letter* No. 5349, dated May 3, 1754 (received June 5, 1754).

Council regarding the advisability of excluding Trichinopoly from the *Articles* of the Treaty. Even Venkaṭa Rao's utmost endeavours to promote the settlement (in June) were of little avail. The Daḷavāi, as the Vakīl represented,⁵⁵ was not only disinclined to grant him an audience but also, when repeatedly written to at the President's desire, in the matter of peace, viewed him with suspicion and disfavour. The truth, however, was that, during the period of these activities, Nanjarājaiya, while he had "great expectations" from a much talked arrival of Pēshwa Bālāji Rao in the South,⁵⁶ was under the strong influence of Dupleix who, to counteract the English policy, had written to Madras of his intention "to give Trichinopoly to the Mysorean."⁵⁷

In June-July, Lawrence wrote⁵⁸ to Saunders, objecting to the plan of an accommodation with the Daḷavāi and pointing to the defects inherent in it, namely, the uncertainty of an alliance only consented to through necessity; the unfairness of giving up the Nawāb's cause after having long supported him "in the breach of a promise extorted from him by force;" the unsoundness of making peace for the realisation of the Nawāb's debt to the Company; the risk involved in the twelve months' time allowed for the delivery of the Trichinopoly Fort to Mysore, and the weakness and insufficiency of the securities proposed to bind the Daḷavāi with in satisfaction of the Nawāb's debt. Lawrence seemed, on the whole, to be much in favour of leaving things to take their own course and trying other resources for the recovery of the English advances to the

55. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 121-122: *Letter* No. 244, dated June 14, 1754 (received July 8, 1754)—Venkaṭa Rao to Saunders; also *Press List*, p. 818: *Letter* No. 5379 of the same date.

56. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 102: *Consultation* dated April 25, 1754.

57. *Vide* f.n. 51 *supra*.

58. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 146-147, 171-175: Board's *Proceedings* dated June 20 and July 29, 1754. Of the two letters of Lawrence, the first appears to have been written early in June 1754; the second was written on July 15 (see *Press List*, p. 858: *Letter* No. 5610).

Nawāb, for, he added,⁵⁹ “If pacific measures take place, the treaty will be partly concluded at home and if the giving up [of] Trichinopoly to Mysore is by them made an article, it is their own dowing, if not, the desire they have that agreement should take place is a sanction to us to do it, should we not like the other means proposed by the enemy for the security of our debt. That offer always remains to be made.”

Far different, however, was the spirit in which Saunders and his Council viewed the proposed treaty and the points raised by the Major. At a *Consultation* on June 20,⁶⁰ they resolved “that the fort and country of Trichinopoly being in the Mysore hands does not seem in the least to promise any disadvantage to the Company’s own particular concerns but on the contrary some advantages are offered in the treaty which, though not to be depended upon, are yet favourable; that notwithstanding the King of Tanjore’s wavering behaviour, if the treaty should take place, it must still be his interest to keep him to the Nabob’s cause whilst we engage to protect him, for there is not a single point for him to gain by siding with the enemy . . . but a more weighty argument than all is the heavy debt due by the Nabob to the Company which at this time cannot fall much short of 35 lakhs of rupees, a sum which, should the Company not recover, may greatly affect their credit at home, a debt which, if the war continue on the present footing, will be daily encreasing—an accommodation with the Dalloway on the terms proposed by Vencat Row will immediately discharge the whole or the greatest part, which, if there should be a necessity to continue the war, will certainly enable the Company to wage it with fresh vigour.”

Again, at another *Consultation* on July 29,⁶¹ they recorded: “The main point which requires particular

59. *Ibid.*, p. 172 *supra.*

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147 *supra.*

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-175 *supra.*

observation in the Major's letter is the proposed treaty with the Dalloway which the Board are still of opinion should be concluded or at least attempted as soon as possible for the reasons often repeated in these occurrences. As to those offered against it in the Major's foregoing letter, the Board differ in opinion from them in some respects. In the first place it is urged that the same objections which were first made against the treaty still subsist. The case is very different now from what it was at the time the Mysoreans first declared their pretensions to Trichinopoly . . . We are surrendering [Trichinopoly] because we cannot well maintain it. The Nabob's debt to the Company is swelled to a prodigious sum. Experience has shown that any assistance from Ballazerow [Pēshwa Bālāji Rao] is vain. Salabat Jang is in full possession of the province and can deny the French nothing. The Mysoreans who have already expended perhaps two crores of rupees, continue obstinate, their treasures are not exhausted, and it is not reasonable to imagine that after so immense an expence they will give up the point without some equivalent when they are yet in a condition to contest it, and no other equivalent can be given them . . . Experience has shewn us that the French are always much more plentifully supplied; at all events they may recall de Bussy's army from Salabat Jang which will at any time give them the superiority, and the danger Trichinopoly has already been in through want of provisions and the difficulty of throwing in any quantity when the enemy are superior—ought to deter us from putting it again to that risk. The Nabob's debt to the Company is daily increasing; the conclusion of the treaty with the Dalloway will secure it, nor will any one advantage of trade be lost to the Company by it. The treaty on foot in Europe is not to be depended on. We are directed to be on our guard and the accommodation with the Dalloway is strongly

pressed by the Company, which though it may not end the war, will put it in our power to wage it with advantage.”

“Another reason offered against an accommodation with the Dalloway,” they continued,⁶² “is that after having so long opposed him it will be plainly seen that we came to terms only through necessity, if this were admitted as a just argument against a peace. It must also be confessed that after a war once declared between two powers, it could scarce ever cease till one of them were absolutely conquered, because if either party were to gain an advantage, it would (by a parallel reasoning) be imprudent to trust the antagonist because he might be supposed to submit through necessity to terms which at first he opposed or disliked, but the contrary is seen every day and it is the most common basis of peace. It is further said that if we were ever in the right to support the Nabob in the breach of a promise extorted from him by force that right still subsists. It has already been shewn that the circumstances of affairs are extremely different now from what they were then. How far in point of equity we ought to have interfered is a subject that has not till now been started and indeed too often gives way to the policy of the Government. In the present case there seems to be but little equity on either side of the question, for, on the one hand it is not very conformable to the laws of justice to support the Nabob in the absolute violation of a solemn promise and engagement; on the other hand, the deviation from equity would be as great were we to oblige the Nabob or be instrumental to his performing his promise when it is to give away what he has no right to but is the absolute property of another, as is the fort of Trichinopoly to the Mogul, but this at present seems to be out of the question. It is plain, not the equity of the disputes between the country powers but self-preservation and

62. *Ibid.*

self-interest (motives that influence the great councils of nations) were our inducements for taking part in the present troubles; and our plan may not be found quite void of equity when it is considered that the laws of self-preservation oblige us to ward off a blow aimed by the most desperate enemy to our nation at the very root of our commerce and possessions on this coast. Such have been the motives of our actions, and such must determine our future measures conforming still as nearly as possible to the general laws of equity and reason. These arguments may perhaps be too honest to be used to the world but they are arguments that must naturally flow from every discerning mind. The objection against the security for payment of the Nabob's debt must vanish at once when it is remembered that it does not depend in the least on the Dalloway's faith at the expiration of the 12 months but that it is to be secured by the *sovcars* at this settlement and the Fort is to remain in our possession till the debt is paid"

July-September
1754. During July-September, prospects of an English accommodation with Mysore were not bright. Lawrence's illness being prolonged, the Council repeatedly wrote to Robert Palk,⁶³ desiring him to speed up the negotiations and passing resolutions in the matter. They, however, experienced considerable difficulty in getting anybody to go to the Dalāvāi's camp as interpreter.⁶⁴ At Madras,

63. *Press List*, p. 835: *Letter* No. 5483, dated July 3, 1754; also pp. 846-847: *Letter* Nos. 5549, 5550, dated July 15, 1754. *Robert Palk*: Son of Walter Palk; born, December 1717; Chaplain, E. I. Co., Madras; gave up orders; entered Civil Service, Madras; Member of Council, 1753; Envoy of the Rāja of Tanjore, 1753-1754; conducted negotiations with the French; installed Muhammad Ali as Nawāb of Arcot, 1755; Governor of Madras, November 1763 to January 1767; protected the Rāja of Tanjore against Muhammad Ali; concluded treaty with the Nizām of Hyderabad, November 1766; resigned and returned to England, 1767; M. P. for Ashburton, 1767-1768 and 1774-1787; created Bart., 1772; died, May 1798. The *Palk Straits* is named after him.

64. *Ibid.*

the position of Venkaṭa Rao was by no means better. From time to time he wrote⁶⁵ to the President, requesting the grant of a pass for his people to proceed to Seringapatam, representing the necessities and hardship of his detention (since July 1752), desiring to be speedily permitted to return or his expenses defrayed until his departure, and intimating his having something important for communication to the President. About the middle of September, Nanjarājaiya having disagreed with M. Maissin, the French Commander, left the Mysore army at Rettamalai and Attur, etc., places and marched on to Śrīrangam, sending his cannons and other munitions of war by boat.⁶⁶ By the 26th, Murāri Rao had left Nanjarājaiya, having been bought off by the Nawāb and the king of Tanjore.⁶⁷ At last, on the 29th, the tables were turned by the three months' truce (as from October 11) under the provisional treaty concluded by M. Godeheu (who had succeeded M. Dupleix in Pondicherry early in August) with Saunders.⁶⁸

65. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 121-122: *Letter No. 244*, dated June 14, 1754, cited in *l.n. 55 supra*; p. 161: *Letter No. 323*, dated September 11, 1754; also *Press List*, pp. 867, 884 and 891; *Letter Nos. 5659, 5759 and 5793*, dated August 12, September 7 and 16, 1754; and *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 249: *Board's Proceedings* dated October 24, 1754. According to the last-mentioned document, Venkaṭa Rao, while he declared before the Board that "his master, the Mysore Dalloway" was "ready and willing to agree to the proposals" of peace, represented that his detention in Madras had put him to great expense and deprived him of very honourable and profitable employs in his master's service, and reduced him to very necessitous circumstances, "as his master refuses to make any allowances whilst he remains here." He accordingly submitted to the consideration of the Board, "whether his expences should not be borne out by them." The Board agreed "that his reasonable expences be defrayed." As we shall see in the sequel, it was not till January 1755 that Venkaṭa Rao was allowed to return to Seringapatam.
66. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 214: *Board's Proceedings* dated September 25, 1754; *Count. Corres.*, p. 167: *Letter No. 339*, dated September 26, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders; also *Di. A. Pi.*, IX. 10: *Notes* dated September 12, 1754.
67. *Count. Corres.*, l.c.; also *Ibid.*, p. 154: *Letter No. 311*, dated August 24, 1754—Tanjore to Saunders; and *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 279: *Board's Proceedings* dated December 20, 1754 (referring to Murāri Rao's engagement with Tanjore and the Nawāb, to quit his alliance with Mysore).
68. See *Editorial Note* in Wilks's *Mysoor* (I. 372), quoting from Sir George Forrest's *The Life of Lord Clive* (I. 249-252); also *Ante*, Ch. VI.

Godeheu's pacific policy ran counter to the bellicose intentions of Dupleix. In vain did Dupleix, on the eve of his departure from India, entreat him (Godeheu) to send reinforcements to Trichinopoly.⁶⁹ On the contrary, Godeheu, immediately after the conclusion of his treaty with Saunders, wrote⁷⁰ to M. Maissin (who was again in command since M. Mainville's relinquishment in August 1754), recalling him with the French troops from Śrīrangam, for, under the truce, both the French and the English were to suspend arms for three months in the south and to see that the respective powers, of whom they were allies, likewise observed the engagement strictly. Saunders too, in pursuance of the treaty, ordered⁷¹ the suspension of hostilities by Lawrence's troops at Trichinopoly, advising⁷² Abdul Wāhab Khān (brother of Muhammad Alī at Trichinopoly) and Murāri Rao about the cessation of hostilities (October). Indeed, to the English the truce seemed to promise certain special advantages. By furnishing Trichinopoly with a good store of provisions, they expected a possible alteration in the measures of Nanjarājaiya,⁷³ who, it was believed,⁷⁴ would perhaps be inclined to drop his attempt on Trichinopoly since he would not "much relish the paying inactive troops for three months, at the same time that his grand object is at least removed to a greater distance." Again, even if the French were found, at the end of the period of truce, to be resolved to support the Mysorean claims to Trichinopoly, an alliance with Mysore, the Council at Madras unanimously held,⁷⁵

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Di. A. Pi.*, IX. 45: *Notes* dated October 10, 1754; also references *infra*.

71. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 230: Board's *Proceedings* dated October 1, 1754.

72. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 177, 179: *Letter* Nos. 361 and 367, dated October 9 and 10, 1754.

73. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 214, cited in f.n. 66 *supra*.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 214, 230: Board's *Proceedings* dated September 26 and October 1, 1754.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 248: Board's *Proceedings* dated October 21, 1754.

would, in the last resort, be helpful in reducing them to reasonable terms. The anticipated general results of the truce, on the other hand, seemed even more beneficial to the English, tending to counterbalance their proposed plan of accommodation with Mysore. The Nawāb, it was believed,⁷⁶ would be secure in Trichinopoly and all other possessions of his, "which are by far the largest share of the Arcot province"; the revenues of these countries would be paid "towards the discharge of his debt to the Company"; Nanjarājaiya would be obliged to decamp from Śrīrangam, "both parties [the English and the French] being bound to oppose him if he commits any hostilities," and the province would be secured "from the incursions of the Morattas and all common enemies, which cannot but have a good effect on trade." To Muhammad Alī, too, the truce seemed to open brighter prospects. Supported by Salābat Jang, as he claimed,⁷⁷ he became more firm than ever in his resolution to preserve the fort of Trichinopoly, declaring⁷⁸ "that the Mysorean has no demand of the country or town except his debt," and desiring⁷⁹ his allies (*i.e.*, the English) to allow the same "in the accounts of the *Peishkash*" alleged to be due by him (the king of Mysore) to the Mughal.

None was, perhaps, more adversely affected by the truce than Nanjarājaiya who continued to maintain friendly relations with M. Godeheu despite his first disagreement with M. Maissin (September).⁸⁰ Early in October, M. Maissin, in compliance with Godeheu's orders, sent a small detachment of French troops across the Coleroon, *en route* to Pondicherry.⁸¹ Nanjarājaiya, helpless against

76. *Ibid.*, p. 283: Board's *Proceedings* dated December 22, 1754.

77. *Count. Corres.*, p. 197: *Letter* No. 416, dated November 7, 1754—Nawāb to Saunders.

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Di. A. Pi.*, IX. 22, 26, 29, 31, 43-44: *Notes* dated September 14, 15, 20 and October 7, 1754.

81. *Ibid.*, 45, cited in f.n. 70 *supra*.

an attack by the enemy—Murāri having left him—explored him (M. Maissin) “to stay a month or fifteen days,” at least “until he could fetch dhoolies, palankeens, carts, etc., from the city [? Trichinopoly]” to remove his family.⁸² “But,” we are told,⁸³ “he refused and persisted in departing,” whereupon Nanjarājaiya resolved to assemble his wife and children in a house and blow it up with gunpowder. The calamity, however, was averted, M. Maissin having in the meanwhile received Godeheu’s permission to remain with the Dalāvāi. Nanjarājaiya was overjoyed at this; his hopes of Trichinopoly seemed to revive; he provided M. Maissin with money for his expenses, promising “a lakh more in eight days,” and wrote⁸⁴ to Godeheu assuring him of the payment of his arrears to the French Government. It was not, however, till about October 20 that Nanjarājaiya received intimation of Godeheu’s truce, with the latter’s instructions that he “must not attack Muhammad Ali Khan or their countries.”⁸⁵ Nanjarājaiya was deeply shocked that the truce had been concluded by Godeheu without his knowledge.⁸⁶ Indeed he wrote⁸⁷ to him, pleading how he had hoped to settle his affairs with Muhammad Ali and the English for rupees 60 lakhs, by which he expected to find means to pay his debt to the French and return to his country, and how the truce upset his calculations by enabling them (Muhammad Ali and the English) to strengthen themselves with forces and provisions, and to devise other plans to beat him with on the expiry of the truce. About the end of October, the position of Nanjarājaiya at Śrīrangam seemed insecure. He had only a small force at his disposal; ⁸⁸ Godeheu had recalled all the French troops except 300 military and

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Ibid.*, 45-46, 59-60: Notes dated October 10, 17, 1754.

84. *Ibid.*, 46 *supra*.

85. *Ibid.*, 59 *supra*.

86. *Ibid.*, 72: Notes dated October 22, 1754.

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*, 83-84: Notes dated October 29, 1754.

1,000 foot with M. Maissin,⁸⁹ while Muhammad Ali and the English, as Nanjarājaiya complained,⁹⁰ were gathering troops at the fort of Trichinopoly daily, 100 military or 200 sepoy at a time. Nanjarājaiya wrote to Godeheu hinting at reinforcements being sent, but was told that no harm could be done to him under the truce and that Muhammad Ali was going to Cuddalore.⁹¹

Nevertheless, Nanjarājaiya hardly ever thought of giving up his claims to Trichinopoly, having, as he said,⁹² so far “spent over two crores of rupees” on the enterprise. His persistence became a source of alarm to the English, contrary to their expectations. As a Madras *Despatch* records:⁹³ “Should the King of Mysore get Trichinopoly, he would become a dangerous neighbour, as both the French and the English have settlements in the kingdom of Tanjore . . . The King of Mysore is regarded as the richest and most powerful prince that pays tribute to the Moghal; but inspite of his extensive territory, ‘ambition and avarice prompted him to his scheme on Trichinopoly.’ The king is young and all the power lies in the hands of the Dalaway, whose brother commands the Mysore troops at Śrīrangam. The expedition has cost great sums, but though the Mysoreans are reputed tenacious, they have been beaten so often and trust the French so little, that they would have withdrawn long ago but that the Dalaway’s brother fears for his life should he acknowledge his defeat by withdrawal.” In a letter⁹⁴ of his to Godeheu, Nanjarājaiya not only desired him to have the Dutch and Danes as

89. *Ibid.*90. *Ibid.*91. *Ibid.*92. *Ibid.*, 12, 26: *Notes* dated September 12, 14, 1754.93. *Mad. Desp.*, p. 249: *Despatch* dated November 10, 1754; see also Ch. IX, f.n. 39. [The king was 26 years of age at the time. The reference to the kingdom of Mysore being a tributary State of the Mughal is more in keeping with the current political conceptions of the time than the realities of the position as explained in Ch. IV, f.n. 19 (*q.v.*).]94. *Di. A. Pi.*, 97: *Notes* dated November 15, 1754.

mediators during his discussions on peace with the English, but also pointed to his belief in the ultimate success of his own cause as against Muhammad Ali's, for he reiterated,⁹⁵ "If they [the English] speak on behalf of Muhammad Ali Khan and you [Godeheu] on ours, Muhammad Ali Khan cannot win the day, by reason of the grant he made me of Trichinopoly fort and country." With a view to his eventually taking Trichinopoly, Nanjarājaiya continued also his professions of friendship with the French, expecting from Godeheu supplies of troops and ammunitions, and promising to pay up his dues to the French Government.⁹⁶

Although Nanjarājaiya (at Śrīrangam) appears to have desisted from hostilities during the period covered by the three months' truce (October 1754-January 1755), disturbances of a general character continued to prevail in South India.⁹⁷ On January 11, Godeheu's provisional treaty with Saunders was terminated by an eighteen months' peace between the French and the English.⁹⁸ Three days later Saunders resigned his office at Madras and sailed home, being succeeded by George Pigot (1755-1763). At the same time Barakki Venkaṭa Rao (the Mysore Vakīl at Madras) was also allowed to return to Seringapatam,⁹⁹ the English plan of accommodation with Mysore having been kept in abeyance for the time being. Disappointed, Nanjarājaiya, who continued to remain at Śrīrangam (with M. Dusaussaye, French Commander in succession to M. Maissin),¹⁰⁰ and whose

95. *Ibid.*

96. *Ibid.*, 130-131: *Notes* dated December 29, 1754; also 96: *Notes* dated November 13, 1754 (referring to the receipt of two elephants from Nanjarājaiya as presents to Godeheu).

97. *Count. Corres.*, pp. 199-200: *Letter* No. 419, dated December 8, 1754—Abdul Wāhab Khān to Saunders; *Di. Cons. Bk.*, p. 284: *Consultation* dated December 22, 1754.

98. *Ante*, Ch. VI. This well-known Peace is also referred to in Nanjarājaiya's letter to Godeheu (see *Di. A. Pi.*, 176-178: *Notes* dated February 23, 1755).

99. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 8. 100. *Di. A. Pi.*, 147: *Notes* dated January 26, 1755.

movements were closely watched by the English at Trichinopoly (under Major Alexander Heron),¹⁰¹ began to levy exactions in Toreyūr, Ariyalūr and Valikoṇḍapuram,¹⁰² and carry on incursions into the Nawāb's possessions.¹⁰³ In February, Muhammad Alī and the English promptly answered by the seizure of the southern and middle countries (comprising Madura, Tinnevely and Naḍumaṇḍalam), which Nanjarājaiya claimed to belong to Mysore.¹⁰⁴ Nanjarājaiya repeatedly complained to the French about these aggressions (of Muhammad Alī and his allies), remarking that the eighteen months' time was enforced only against himself.¹⁰⁵ He wrote¹⁰⁶ also to Godeheu, recapitulating the details of his alliance with the French since 1753, and seeking his assistance either to take Trichinopoly or recover from Muhammad Alī all his expenses (to enable him to meet the pressing demands of Salābat Jang and de Bussy on Mysore). Nanjarājaiya, however, was only desired¹⁰⁷ to observe the "peace" and to desist from hostilities in Toreyūr (claimed to belong to the French), as otherwise he would be treated as an enemy. Early in March, Nanjarājaiya declared that Toreyūr was a dependency of Mysore, and that he was regularly receiving tribute from it.¹⁰⁸ He also, in satisfaction of his dues to the French, executed in favour of the Toreyūr

101. *Di. Cons. Bk.* (1755), pp. 4, 6: Board's *Proceedings* dated January 6, 8, 1755.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 16: *Consultation* dated January 25, 1755; also *Di. A. Pi.*, 179, 184-185: *Notes* dated February 28, and March 5, 1755. Toreyūr, Ariyalūr and Valikoṇḍapuram are places in the Trichinopoly district, being situated in the present Musiri, Uḍaiyārpālayam and Perumbalūr taluks respectively.

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22: *Consultation* dated January 31, 1755. See also *Ibid.*, p. 26: *Consultation* dated February 11, 1755 (referring to the Board's "approval of the measures taken by Major Heron to get satisfaction from the Mysoreans," etc.)

104. *Di. A. Pi.*, 176-178, 206, 254: *Notes* dated February 23, March 21, and April 10, 1755.

105. *Ibid.*, 177-178, 206 *supra*.

106. *Ibid.*, 176-178 *supra*.

107. *Ibid.*, 179: *Notes* dated February 28, 1755.

108. *Ibid.*, 188: *Notes* dated March 6, 1755.

Pālegār (Paramānanda Pillai) a bond for a lakh of rupees (sent by M. Barthelemy) on the security of Kandāchār Channappaiya.¹⁰⁹ Yet Nanjarājaiya found himself in great straits. To the French he still owed a heavy balance of 20 to 22 lakhs, to Murāri 10 to 12 lakhs;¹¹⁰ he had flung away, as was estimated,¹¹¹ 3 to 4 crores of rupees on the Trichinopoly business, and was on ill terms with his master ("Rāja of Mysore").¹¹² He tried other means to gain his object. Towards the close of March, we learn,¹¹³ he "got together a great number of troops and prepared four hundred scaling ladders, with a design to make an attempt on Trichinopoly," despite "the representations and threats of the French officer [M. Dusaussaye]" with him. The attempt, however, failed (Major James Kilpatrick having been instructed to dislodge the Mysoreans in co-operation with the French, and Captain John Caillaud being sent to the relief of Trichinopoly—now stored with one year's provisions).¹¹⁴ And it resulted only in breeding dissensions between Nanjarājaiya and the French. His next plan to take the fort by winning over the English soldiers was likewise a failure.¹¹⁵ In the meanwhile, his troops continued to ravage and disturb the countryside;¹¹⁶ but as their pay had fallen into arrears, they, early in April, incited by Muhammad Alī, sat in *dharna* before his house.¹¹⁷ Their rising, however, was promptly quelled by Haidar Alī, on his promising to satisfy them with half their dues within three

109. *Ibid.*, 190-191 : Notes dated March 7, 1755.

110. *Ibid.*, 238-239, 247-248 : Notes dated April 7-8, 1755.

111. *Ibid.*, l.c. ; also 255 : Notes dated April 11, 1755.

112. *Ibid.*

113. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 53, 57 : Board's *Proceedings* dated April 2, 3, 1755.

114. *Ibid.* ; also pp. 4, 56 and 65 : Board's *Proceedings* dated January 6, April 3 and 5, 1755.

115. *Ibid.*, p. 64 : *Consultation* dated April 12, 1755.

116. *Count. Corres.* (1755), p. 28 : *Letter* No. 63, dated April 1, 1755—Pigot to Salābat Jang.

117. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 10.

days.¹¹⁸ The French Government too (under the new Governor, M. de Leyrit, 1755-1758) continued to press Nanjarājaiya for their dues,¹¹⁹ though he had, in part satisfaction, mortgaged to them Śrīrangam, Jambukēśvaram, etc., places between the Cauvery and the Coleroon, yielding about 4 lakhs annually.¹²⁰ At Śrīrangam, on the other hand, M. Dusaussaye, the French Commander, mounted a cannon on the Rāyagōpuram and posted infantry along the roads.¹²¹ Nanjarājaiya proposed terms to him, which, however, did not prove acceptable.¹²²

At last, on the night of April 8, alarmed by a report of the death of his brother Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya, and by an urgent call from Seringapatam (which was, as we shall see in the sequel,¹²³ invaded by Pēshwa Bālāji Rao and Salābat Jang), Nanjarājaiya marched on from Śrīrangam by way of Ariyalūr and Toreyūr, having given up all hopes of Trichinopoly, after more than three years' untiring activities in the South.¹²⁴

118. *Ibid.* For details of Haidar's services on the occasion, see under *Early Career and Rise of Haidar Ali* in Ch. X.

119. *Di. A. Pi.*, 207, 238-239, 247-248: *Notes* dated March 21, April 7-8, 1755.

120. *Di. Cons. Bk.*, 76, 98: *Consultation* dated April 26 and June 19, 1755; also *Di. A. Pi.*, 292-293: *Notes* dated April 25, 1755.

121. *Di. A. Pi.*, 261: *Notes* dated April 12, 1755.

122. *Ibid.*

123. *Vide* Ch. IX below.

124. *Di. A. Pi.*, 255, 257-259, 260-261, 265-266: *Notes* dated April 11, 12 and 13, 1755; see also and compare *Di. Cons. Bk.*, pp. 66, 70, 72, 75-76, 78 and 85: *Consultations* dated April 21-23, 1755; *Count. Corres.*, p. 30: *Letter* No. 72, dated April 12, 1755—Nawāb to Pigot; and *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 10. The death of Daḷavāi Dēvarājaiya in April 1755, as reported in the *Di. A. Pi.* (260, 283: *Notes* dated April 12 and 21, 1755) and in the *Di. Cons. Bk.* (p. 76 *supra*), afterwards proved to be false (see *Di. A. Pi.*, 290-291: *Notes* dated April 25, 1755). The Daḷavāi's demise actually took place in June 1758 (see Ch. IX). For an estimate of Nanjarājaiya's foreign policy with reference to the Trichinopoly issue, *vide* Ch. XIII.